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Live, but never learn

There is nothing new in the report,' commented General Ved Prakash Malik, Chief of the Army Staff, about the Kargil Review Committee report. He says the failure of intelligence agencies was known. The Committee has only confirmed it.

Both the Committee and General Malik have singled out the Research and Analysis Wing for blame. General Malik admits the failure of his own set-up. But he puts most of the responsibility on the shoulders of RAW which, he feels, was established to collect external intelligence and which failed to give any prior information about the Pakistani invasion.

But Brian Cloughley, a British military expert, defends RAW in his book, A History of the Pakistan Army, which has just come out of Karachi. He says: 'Nobody expects a RAW man to be leaping from peak to peak at 16,000 feet while soldiers are snug in base camps below.' His argument is that if the US, with its enormously sophisticated technical intelligence methods, could not detect the build-up and incursions, it is hardly fair to blame RAW.

The Committee's criticism on 'lack of inter-agency coordination as well as lack of coordination between the army and the agencies' is justified. But the same points were made after the 1962 war against China and the 1965 war against Pakistan. Even then, the intelligence agencies were found culpably negligent. The armed forces suffered because the three services did not jell together as they should have.

In its report on action indicated, the government has, however, promised to develop the Committee's suggestion on coordination in 'specific actionable policies and programmes.' One hopes the assurance will not get lost in the bureaucratic jungle that the defence ministry is.

General Malik is sore about this. Even after making the announcement that it would post officers from the three services in the defence ministry, he says the DM has not done so. It would have helped civilian officers understand and appreciate the problems of the armed forces better.

The same old questions are asked: Why is such equipment needed and why cannot a substitute serve the purpose? Every bit has to be explained. Files go up and down all the time. Had officers from the army, navy and air force been inducted into the ministry, decisions would have been quicker and more meaningful. This is what General Malik feels.

The army chief complains that certain equipment indented as far back as 1982 still awaits the ministry's sanction. The entire process is entangled in red tape. He feels the Kargil operation helped him acquire some weapons quickly, but he does not find the same urgency now.

The Committee has also criticised the government on this point. 'Though the new light rifle (5.56 mm) has been inducted into service, most troops are yet to be equipped with light rifles. Adequate attention has not been paid to lightening the load on infantry soldiers deployed on high altitudes.' In broader terms, the committee feels that combat efficiency has suffered as has the modernisation process on the whole. General Malik agrees with this. Once, he says, he had to agree to the reduction of the army by 50,000 men to get money for modernisation. Otherwise, it was not possible.

'Nawaz Sharif was at least aware of the broad thrust of the Kargil plan when he so warmly welcomed the Indian prime minister in Lahore,' the Committee feels. This observation is endorsed by General Malik. He too has no doubts about the then Pakistan prime minister's involvement in the Kargil intrusion. How much and how far, he does not try to guess. But he goes along with the observation by Pakistan Chief Executive General Pervez Musharraf that 'everyone was on board.'

When I asked Atal Bihari Vajpayee about this at a function to release my book on Bhagat Singh, the prime minister said there was 'enough evidence' to indicate Nawaz Sharif was aware of the operation when he met him at Lahore. 'But I do not want to say more at a time when he is in jail,' said Vajpayee.

General Malik does not think the Kargil operation could have escalated into a full-scale war. Once the Indian forces began to push back the intruders, Pakistan realised the game was up. Indeed, the Indian forces faced tough situations, but they were able to overcome them.

Once General Malik was so exasperated that he almost went to the Cabinet to seek permission to cross the Line of Control. However, the ground reality rapidly changed in India's favour. He says he has never yielded to pressure. Once, he even threatened to resign when he felt he was being pressurised. This was, however, long before the Kargil operation.

I had an hour-long conversation with General Malik. He frankly says the armed forces should not be used for counter-insurgency operations. But he singles out Kashmir which, he believes, has to be defended from intruders from the other side. He considers it a theatre of war. However, he does not want the army to be involved in operations in the northeast. That matter, he feels, needs a political solution.

The army chief believes there is no likelihood of a regular war between India and Pakistan. But he does fear occasional border clashes. He also rules out the use of nuclear weapons. The Committee too is of the opinion that 'with the passage of time, crying nuclear wolf, even if linked to Kashmir, would progressively lose credibility.'

General Malik is confident that the report on Kargil will make the defence ministry and intelligence agencies rectify its deficiencies. But as far as the army is concerned, he says, its report by one of his officers exists and it has already begun necessary action.

It is unfortunate that Observer Group Editor-in Chief R K Mishra, who was brokering a settlement on Kashmir with Niaz Naik, Pakistan's former foreign secretary, did not meet the Committee 'in view of the current situation in Pakistan.' Whatever it means, it blocks information on the formula which almost gave the two countries a breakthrough. Vajpayee once told me in an interview that the two countries were 'close to a solution.'

Cloughley has, however, put cold water on the efforts by Mishra and Naik. He says: 'Openings to dialogue were effected, but the moves resulted in internal criticism in both countries and, although valuable in establishing a modest approach to future personal contact, had no chance of success.' His reading is that in the end Nawaz Sharif, failing to obtain support of any sort, even from China, had to crave audience with the American president to obtain 'a fig-leaf that would enable him to order a retreat with a semblance of dignity.'

Could India have avoided a Kargil-type situation? The Committee says perhaps it could have been averted 'if the Indian army had followed a policy of Siachenisation to plug unheld gaps along the 168-km stretch from Kaobal Gali to Chorbatla.' This would have entailed establishing a series of winter cut-offs posts with communications and other logistic support. This is what the government is doing now.

Just as New Delhi has conducted an analysis, so must Islamabad have. One wishes it could be as frank as the assessment by Talat Masood, a top retired Pakistan army officer. His comment in a Pakistan daily was: 'The Kargil crisis has once again exposed the bankruptcy of Pakistan's national policy. Events in and around Kargil brought India and Pakistan dangerously close to an all out war, dealt a shattering blow to the peace process, done immense damage to the already faltering economy, isolated Pakistan internationally, and proved highly divisive internally.'

Kuldip Nayar