Nonproliferation activists who have been leading the charge against the India-US civilian nuclear agreement arguing that it undermines the already besieged Nuclear Nonroliferation Treaty have redoubled their efforts to kill the deal in the wake of the North Korean nuclear test.

The activists declared that North Korea's action had unquestionably cast a shadow on the accord, which is yet to be approved by the US Congress.

The Bush Administration however has taken strong issue with such a contention and asserted that comparing India -- with its impeccable nonproliferation track record -- with the likes of North Korea and Iran is obscene at the very least and that bringing New Delhi into the nonproliferation regime will strengthen it and stop it from unravelling in the wake of action by the likes of Pyongyang.

Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, who has coordinated the coalition of the country's leading nonproliferation activists against the deal, said, "The North Korean test will heighten the concerns and awareness of US lawmakers about the problems facing global nonproliferation efforts, and I would hope lead them to better understand and support our critique of the current proposal for renewed India-US nuclear trade."

He told rediff.com that in the wake of Pyongyang's nuclear test, going ahead with the India-US nuclear deal will "further undermine the NPT and the broader global nuclear nonproliferation effort."

Kimball said, "The global nuclear nonproliferation system is under stress because North Korea continues to press ahead with its nuclear weapons program, Iran secretly pursued a uranium enrichment program, Pakistan spawned the A Q Khan network, and India and Pakistan continue to produce and develop nuclear weapons outside the regime."

"There are insufficient barriers against the proliferation of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technologies than can be used to make weapons, and because of the failure of the nuclear weapons states to verifiably reduce the number and role of nuclear weapons in their security policies," he complained.

Reiterating the perennial spiel of the nonproliferation lobby ever since the India-US nuclear deal was announced, Kimball said, "Non-nuclear-weapon states have for decades remained true to the original NPT bargain and foresworn nuclear weapons and accepted full-scope IAEA safeguards in return for access to peaceful nuclear technology under strict and verifiable control."

He pointed out that "many of these states made this choice despite strong pressure to spurn the NPT and pursue the nuclear weapons path," and warned that "they might make a different choice in the future if non-NPT members like India receive civil nuclear assistance under less rigorous terms."

Kimball said, "Whether or not the Indian people decide to elect leaders who want to build more nuclear weapons, stop building nuclear weapons, or help eliminate nuclear weapons, it is the responsibility of other states not to assist India -- or any other state -- in building nuclear weapons."

This deal, he said, if consummated "will allow India to expand its rate of fissile material production for weapons by freeing up its limited uranium supply to be exclusively devoted to the military program."

Kimball said that especially after the North Korean nuclear test, "I think it is important for India to decide whether it wants to be part of the problem or part of the solution -- by that I mean, will India join with other states in a legally binding test moratorium, or insist on having the option to conduct further nuclear weapon test blasts."

But State Department spokesman Sean McCormack dismissed attempts to draw any parallel between the North Korean nuclear test and the India-US deal, saying New Delhi had an impeccable nonproliferation track record and was "a responsible actor," in this area and countered with the consistent Administration argument that the deal was good for the nonproliferation regime.

He said that "the United States has made it very clear that we are for the peaceful development of nuclear power. That is the deal that the vast majority of countries around the world have signed up to in the Nonproliferation Treaty."

"With respect to India," McCormack noted, "we have made it very clear that we think that the deal we have struck with India and now we are working with the Congress to pass is to the benefit of the United States, to the benefit of India and to the benefit to the nonproliferation regime worldwide."

He said that "India has been a responsible actor in that regard. We have certainly made that judgment."

McCormack's arguments were reinforced by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Nicholas Burns, who told reporters after addressing the Council on Foreign Relations, that "India is a peaceful, democratic, law-abiding leader of the international community."

"North Korea is the reverse of all that," he said. "And, so there is great trust in commitments that the Indian government made to us will be fulfilled and we are very confident that the India deal will be approved by a substantial margin."

Burns said the Administration was "determined to fulfill the commitments we made to the Indian government," and noted that he and other senior officials continued to work assiduously with the Republican and Democratic leadership "to see if it would be possible to have a vote in the lame-duck session (of the enabling legislation to facilitate the nuclear deal)," when the Senate reconvenes after the November 7 elections.

He said he continued to be in touch with Shyam Saran -- the special envoy for the India-US nuclear agreement -- and new Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon "over the last week to assure that the US wants to go forward on all of the definite initiatives that President Bush and Prime Minister Singh talked in March in New Delhi."

But notwithstanding Burns' optimism, there was foreboding among senior diplomatic sources that the Senate not taking up the legislation for debate and a vote before it recessed for the November election may have killed any chances of it being approved in this year's Congress.

Despite the commitment by both the Republican and Democratic leadership to take up the legislation when Congress returns for the lame-duck session, these sources acknowledged that now the North Korean nuclear test complicating the deal to the extent that it could once again ignite the passion of the nonproliferation advocates in the Senate.

It could also result in the real possibility of a majority Democrat Senate and House, which will embolden some Democrats who have been opposing the deal to string out the debate with a long line of amendments and leave the legislation in limbo and force it to be re-introduced next year in a new Congress.

These sources were acutely cognizant that with the Bush Administration's political capital dissipating as it has been during the past several months would hardly lend itself to any pitch by the President himself being able to push for the deal in the lame-duck session, especially if the Republicans lose control of the Congress, particularly the Senate, which some surveys have said the Democrats have a fair shot at regaining.

Alan Kronstadt, Asian specialist at the Congressional Research Service -- the think tank of the US Congress -- told rediff.com: "I believe it is very likely that it will be taken up in the lame-duck session. The Republican leadership has indicated that that's the case and I think it's clear that there's bilateral support."

"The House vote was a clear demonstration of that and it's now just a matter of procedurally -- can they and will they get it through."

But Kronstadt acknowledged that if it does not come up in the lame-duck session, it would necessarily lose its momentum. "The past year has shown that momentum is very important. To keep something like this alive, it needs to keep moving -- almost like a shark. It can't stay dead in the water or it will fall apart."

He said that "perception might create reality," and agreed that "perception can go a long way to creating reality, but it doesn't necessarily have to mean anything -- how it turns out in this Congress, but it will change perceptions, particularly over concerns about a change in the majority party in Congress."

Kronstadt however noted that even if this first part of a two-pronged legislation is approved, final approval of legislation which would envisage the transfer of nuclear reactors and other nuclear technology to India is at best, a long ways off and it would be months or years before the deal can be consummated, if at all.

He said India still has several commitments it needs to meet, including the completion of the bilateral civilian cooperation agreement -- also known as the 123 Agreement -- the safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, and also endorsement by consensus for the deal by the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

"There are a lot of steps that need to take place, including the two in Congress," Kronstadt said. "It is a complex deal and a lot of people don't understand the complexities -- it's very difficult. Even a lot of people working on it don't understand all of the complexities."

Kronstadt also said that 'there are a lot of signs that the rest of the world is watching. There have been statements that have come out of the NSG -- that they are watching."

"Internationally, there are a lot of people suggesting -- not explicitly -- but suggesting implying that they are watching what the US Congress is going to do and so this is a very important step in the process to have it come out of the Congress as an agreement in principle, and then we will see probably what the actual nuclear agreement is."

Meanwhile, Kimball said the nonproliferation lobby's strategy in opposing the deal would remain the same.

"If the Senate does find time during the lame-duck session to consider S 3709, I expect there will be a number of amendments proposed to fix the deep flaws in the proposal," he said.

Kimball predicted that "some of these can win a majority of support," and added, "We have been quite transparent and specific about our concerns in a letter sent to the Senate on September 12."

He said, "We support better ties with India, better energy supply options for India, and recognition of India's important role in the world, but not at the cost of undermining international security."

Kimball said, "If India were to agree to limits on fissile production for weapons, I believe the arrangement would be a net plus and not a net minus for global security."

He said that as part of the nonproliferation lobby's strategy, and echoing Kronstadt's caveats, "We will also be reminding Senators that the proposal is not a 'done deal' given that it also requires India to reach agreement with the IAEA on a safeguards agreement, 'consistent with IAEA standards and practices,' a formal nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States, and consensus among the NSG's 45-member states to change their rules that currently restrict trade with states like India that do not accept meaningful, full-scope IAEA safeguards."

"This flawed proposal has many hurdles to climb, and unless it is adjusted, I think it will eventually fail," Kimball said.