A known critic of the Indo-US civil nuclear deal has claimed that the agreement, which he said would provide New Delhi with uranium for fissile material production, could lead to an arms race between India, Pakistan and China.

"The civilian nuclear deal will free up for India, the uranium needed for its weapons programme, will force Pakistan to keep pace and perhaps even make China to re-think resuming fissile material production," Robert Einhorn, a former US State Department official, said.

Einhorn, a key official dealing with non proliferation issues during the Bill Clinton administration, was speaking at a panel discussion on 'Forging Non Proliferation Consensus after US-Indian Civil Nuclear Cooperation'.

He said the deal posed several risks -- some countries under pressure will calculate that costs are 'manageable' and that the US will show 'understanding', that rules can be bent or ignored under the pretext of commerce and the substantial increase in the fissile material stock leaving open the possibilities of theft and seizure.

The US, in the process of forging the new consensus, has a special responsibility to allay fears of allies and reassure commitment to security in the context of what has happened with Iran and North Korea, Einhorn said.

About India's contribution in the NPT regime, Einhorn, presently with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, maintained that New Delhi should resist 're-making' it.

"It is not what the non proliferation regime can do for India but what India can do for the non proliferation regime," Einhorn said, adding that New Delhi should take a 'more energetic role' on proliferation issues as well as joining others in limiting strategic weapons programmes.

Peter Potman of the Royal Netherlands Embassy said that the civilian nuclear deal should address strategic restraint by India, the IAEA safeguards should be of the 'right' kind and 'closing the back door' on nuclear cooperation whereby countries within the NPT break away and then look for ways on nuclear cooperation.

"Non proliferation consensus is prone to change and hard to define. Yet it is a very simple one -- more nuclear weapons states are not good for international security and the world has to reduce its nuclear weapons," he said.